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The eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of a great number of learned
societies all across Europe. The Royal Society of London (RSL) was the paradigm
case of this kind of societies, but by no means the only one. With the RSL in mind
as their inspiration, over 200 societies were established between 1700 and 1799,1
some being ‘specialized’ societies (i.e. literary, cultural, agricultural, economic,
political, poetical, scientific, and antiquary), some discussing a mixture of topics.
Despite the great number and variety of learned societies, there have been only a
few in depth studies regarding them, of course excluding the vast amount of
literature available on the Royal Society. There are very few texts that deal with
Scottish societies at length: H. Lewis Ulman edited and published the minutes of the
Aberdeen Philosophical Society in 1990, Davis McElroy wrote his PhD thesis on
Scottish societies and later published a book (McElroy 1952, 1969), and historian
Roger L. Emerson has a number of articles (Emerson 1973, 1979, 1981, 1985,
1988) on the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, besides his extensive and insight-
ful research on Scotland in the enlightenment period. Other than these academics,
the societies are only briefly mentioned in anthologies on Scotland and the enlight-
enment, or in biographies of the intellectuals of the eighteenth century, usually
being little more than an anecdote.
One reason for this lack of research on the learned societies is the scarcity of
empirical evidence, since only few of the original minute books, discussions, or
publications from several societies have survived. Even so, there is enough material
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worth looking into. This lack of a detailed research is shocking, especially because
most of the intellectuals in the second half of the eighteenth century were members
of at least one of such learned societies. Studying them will not only enhance our
understanding of the Scottish enlightenment, but it could also help us shed light on
the intellectual context and development of some of its most relevant figures.
In this paper I investigate two of the Scottish learned societies, The Philoso-
phical Society of Edinburgh and the Select Society of Edinburgh, from a specific
focus point: I am interested in the role played by the experimental method. This
method, originating in Bacon’s works and adopted and developed by intellectuals
throughout the second half of the seventeenth and the whole of the eighteenth
century, was regarded by most of the British philosophers to be the only method
that made the acquisition of knowledge possible. I believe that this method played
a very important role in the development and success of these learned societies,
and an examination of the available material will provide enough evidence to
support my claim. I will first introduce a relevant methodological framework for
our present purpose: the experimental/speculative distinction. With this terms in
mind, we can explore the main inspiration for most learned societies, Bacon’s
college described in his New Atlantis. These two aspects will provide us with a
proper framework to examine the rules, question lists, and minute books of the
societies to discover how the distinction played a prominent role. This is followed
by an examination of some of the discourses and discussions to show that the use
of the distinction was not just rhetorical, but expresses a deep commitment to the
experimental method as the only way to acquire knowledge. Finally, we will take
a look at the most important feature the experimental method could offer to the
societies: the practicality that would allow them to contribute to the progress of
Scotland as a nation.
9.2 The Experimental/Speculative Distinction
For the past 2 years I have been part of a research project at the University of
Otago. It is titled “Experimental Philosophy and the Origins of Empiricism”, led
by Peter Anstey, with Alberto Vanzo, Kirsten Walsh, and myself contributing to
the project. We are arguing for new terms of reference to approach philosophy in
the early modern period. The distinction between rationalism and empiricism has
been the traditional way of talking about philosophy in the eighteenth century.
We believe that the distinction between speculative and experimental philosophy
can provide us with a better understanding of the early modern period. Besides
being the actual terms used by late seventeenth and eighteenth century philoso-
phers (the terms ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’ in their modern sense only
emerged after Kant), they provide us with a more accurate interpretation of the
development of early modern philosophy.
The base for the project can be found in Peter Anstey’s ‘Experimental vs.
speculative Natural Philosophy’ (Anstey 2005). I will briefly present how the
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experimental/speculative distinction plays out, leaning on Anstey’s article. There
are five main claims Anstey argues for:
1. This distinction is in evidence, in some form or other, from the late 1650s until
the early decades of the eighteenth century.
2. This distinction provides the primary methodological framework within which
natural philosophy was interpreted and practised in the late seventeenth century
3. This distinction is independent of disciplinary boundaries within and closely
allied to natural philosophy
4. This distinction crystallised in the 1690s when opposition to hypotheses in
natural philosophical methodology intensified
5. This distinction provides the terms of reference by which we should interpret
Newton’s strictures on the use of hypotheses in natural philosophy (Anstey
2005, p. 216).
Anstey’s article focuses on the distinction within natural philosophy, but our
research project goes beyond that. Roughly, when we talk about speculative
philosophy we are referring to “the development of explanations of natural phe-
nomena without prior recourse to systematic observation and experiment;” experi-
mental philosophy consisted in “the collection and ordering of observations and
experimental reports with a view to the development of explanations of natural
phenomena based on these observations and experiments” (Anstey 2005, p. 215).
I believe that such distinction also plays a role outside of natural philosophy: as a
rhetorical device and as the expression of a methodological commitment to the
experimental method. This commitment implied adopting an anti-hypothesis atti-
tude and a strict emphasis on facts and observations as the sources of our
explanations.
It also important to mention here that in Britain most intellectuals sided with
experimental philosophy and in their works the term ‘speculative’ even comes
charged with a derogatory tone. Not only was experimental philosophy the only
valid path to knowledge, but those practicing speculative philosophy were doing
nothing more than the mere construction of fables and fantasies that had nothing to
do with reality. This is not to say that the distinction was used by the British as no
more than a means of justifying the superiority of their intellectual inquiries; on the
contrary, their deep methodological commitment to the experimental method was
what justified their use of the term ‘speculative’ as derogatory.
The origins of the distinction (and the commitment to facts and observation) can
be found in the works of Francis Bacon, but as Anstey points out, not in the same
form it appeared in the last decades of the seventeenth century (Anstey 2005,
p. 217). Bacon is relevant for the attitude he embodied, since he “famously opposed
idle speculation and promoted the derivation of natural knowledge from experi-
ment” (Anstey 2005, p. 217). This approach to the acquisition of knowledge got
impressed in his New Atlantis which was the inspiration for the establishment of the
Royal Society and subsequently most of the eighteenth century philosophical
societies.
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9.3 Bacon’s New Atlantis and Philosophical Societies
It is evident that the institution of the Royal Society of London was inspired by,
dedicated to, and based on Bacon’s work, as we can tell from Cowley’s ode to the
society and Sprat’s History of the Royal Society:
Some few exalted Spirits this latter Age has shown
That Labour’d to assert the Liberty
(From Guardians, who were now Usurpers grown)
Of this Old Minor still, Captiv’d Philosophy;
But ’twas Rebellion called to fight
For such a long oppressed Right
Bacon at last, a mighty Man, arose
Whom a wise King and Nature chose
Lord Chancellour of both their Laws,
And boldly undertook the injur’d Pupils caus (Sprat 1959).
Besides these first-hand accounts, the connection between Solomon’s College of
the New Atlantis and the Royal Society has been constantly mentioned in the
scholarship.2 As for the Scottish Societies in question, we know they also found
their inspiration in Lord Bacon as well as in the Royal Society. It is therefore of our
interest here to examine the nature of Bacon’s Solomon College in order to shed
light on the character of the Scottish learned societies we are investigating.
Lord Bacon’s New Atlantis is a fable, according to Rawley’s preface,
devised to the end that He [Bacon] might exhibite therein a modell or Description of a
Colledge instituted for the Interpreting of Nature and the Producing of Great Marveilous
Works for the Benefit of Men: under the name of Salomon’s house, or the Colledge of the
Six Dayes’ Works (Bacon 1900, p. ix).
Rawley also mentions that the work is incomplete, since Bacon had in mind
the description of a model for the best state as well, but preferred to complete the
description of the college first. It is a story about a ship crew that sets sail from Peru
towards China, by the ‘South Sea,’ but gets lost on the way and stumbles upon the
island of Bensalem. This country is unknown to the Europeans of the time, but the
stranded sailors find a prosperous and civil nation that receives them and treats them
as best as it is possible to imagine. After some days in the island, the stranded sailors
start settling in, and discovering the day to day life of the island. They hear about
Solomon’s College, described as the “very Eye of this Kingdom,” and our narrator
eventually obtains a hearing with one of the fathers of the house, who describes the
college and its workings.
In what follows I want to show, by relying on Bacon’s text, how the learned
societies can be viewed as the instantiation of Solomon’s College. Most of the
description given by the delegate from the college is occupied by a detailed listing
of all the different houses, gardens, pools, caves, mountains and buildings they use
2 For example see Hunter (1989), Lynch (2001).
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for their experiments. Though very interesting, in this paper I am more interested in
the specific end of the college and the description of the functions of the fellows.
The purpose of the college is summed up in the following sentence:
The End of Our Foundation is the Knowledge of Causes, and Secret Motions of Things;
And the Enlarging of the bounds of the Humane Empire, to the effecting of all Things
possible (Bacon 1900, pp. 34–35).
From this statement we can identify two aims of the college, the first being
the actual science, and the second one the improvement of mankind (based on the
achievements of science of course). The Edinburgh societies were committed to
carrying out both this goals, but it was the second one that allowed them to
contribute greatly to the progress of Scotland.
Bacon not only establishes the goals such an academy should aim for, but also
gives us some guidelines on how to achieve them. The college assigned a number of
functions to their fellows to be carried out for this purpose. They are of special
interest because they summarize nicely what the Scottish societies established as
the tasks they had to carry out. There are nine main functions described in the text
(Bacon 1900, pp. 44–45):
1. Travel to foreign countries for the exchange of knowledge.
2. The written collection of experiments. (Scientific)
3. The written collection of experiments. (Non-scientific, e.g. liberal sciences)
4. Trying out new experiments.
5. Categorization of experiments. (Titles and tables)
6. Practical output of experiments.
7. Direct new experiments based on the former. (More penetrating into nature)
8. Execution of experiments.
9. Raise the discoveries of the experiments into Axioms and Aphorisms.
The remaining paragraphs of the description of the college are dedicated to the
ordinances and rites, which are not of our present interest. The brief description we
have given of the goals and functions of the college will help us sketch a picture of
the Edinburgh societies that reflects Bacon’s proposals.
The description given above of the end and functions of the college holds the
essence of the experimental method. It was this approach to the study of nature that
the British philosophers believed would give us knowledge and bring about the
progress of humanity. This experimental method of the new philosophy was
the driving force behind the Scottish societies. Solomon’s college, more than a
general model for the societies, embodied the advantages and benefits of following
an experimental approach to the study of nature and the acquisition of knowledge in
general, as opposed to a purely speculative approach that was detached from facts
and observation. I will rely on the rules, minute books and some of the available
essays to show that (a) The experimental/speculative distinction was employed in
the societies, and (b) The societies were fully committed to the experimental
method of the new philosophy in order to contribute to the progress of Scotland
as a nation.
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9.4 The Evidence
Although there are few written records from the time these Edinburgh societies
functioned, we still have access to some very relevant texts and manuscripts, and
hopefully we’ll be able to identify more in due time. Regarding the Edinburgh
Philosophical Society we have the eight volumes of collected essays published by
the society between 1742 and 1771, and five volumes containing discourses solely
from the absorbed Medical Society (1731–1737). Other than these collections of
essays, we can rely on some mentions of the society in the correspondence and
biographies of some of the members. The case with the Select Society is even
worse, since they had no publications, though their minute book is available. The
work done by Roger Emerson has been remarkable and has served as a perfect
guide for this research. Still, from the primary sources we can find enough passages
to shed light on our understanding of them.
Since there are no surviving minute books, records, membership lists, etc.
belonging to the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, we have to rely on the
prefaces to their five published volumes of essays for information on the way
the society was run and any kind of methodological statements. Besides these
prefaces, the Proposals for the Regulation of a Society for Improving Arts and
Sciences and particularly Natural Knowledgewas published in the General index to
the first 34 of volumes of the Transactions of the royal Society of Edinburgh.
The Proposals outline the administrative regulations for the society, as well as
certain rules regarding topics and guidelines for discussion. One rule in particular
shows the strictly Baconian and experimental approach they had in mind:
Authority is to be held of no weight in their reasonings. The shew of Learning, and
Quotation of Authors sparingly used in their Papers. Things to be minded not words.
Arguments to be chiefly drawn from proper Experiments and clear Consequences deduced
from them or from evident Propositions. Metaphysical Subtilties not be insisted on
(Emerson 1979, p. 165).
This rule highlights the attitude characteristic of experimental philosophy,
rejecting any sort of speculation detached from observation (“metaphysical
subtilties,” emphasis on words and authority) and calling for a due attention to
facts and experiments. It seems that this attitude was carried on from the Proposals
to the established society as we can tell from the prefaces of their published
volumes. The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh emerged in 1737 when Colin
MacLaurin proposed to Alexander Monro, secretary and founding member of the
Medical Society of Edinburgh, to enlarge the project of the society and include
natural philosophy instead of just medicine. The Medical Society had published
from 1731 to 1737 a number of volumes of essays, which were reprinted by the newly
formed Philosophical Society. The second edition of the first volume contains a
number of essays that are highly charged with the rhetoric of experimental philoso-
phy, constantly referring to the emphasis on facts and observation. The volumes are
also dedicated to Sir Hans Sloane and the RSL, which he presided. In the preface
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Monro mentions that they follow the great example of the Royal Society, with the
disclaimer that they would focus only on medical topics. Monro also includes in
the preface a list of regulations for the acceptance of papers. Among them we find
statements that show their adoption of the attitude of experimental philosophy and
their method, highlighting the importance of facts and observations and rejecting any
kind of a priori speculation:
2. (Regulations for papers) Whatever Relation may be found between the Changes in our
Atmosphere and the epidemick Diseases, all seem to agree, that there are certain
Circumstances and Symptoms which distinguish the Return of similar Constitutions and
point out the most probable Method of Success in treating Diseases while such
Constitutions prevail. The only way of discovering certainly these Circumstances and
Symptoms, is a long continued Series of Observations, which we hope our Work will
supply.
2. (Regulations for correspondants) The Descriptions and Virtues of simple Drugs, are to be
clearly and succinctly told, without enlarging on arguments a priori, which are to liable to
lead into Error (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1737–1738, pp. 17 and 19).
The society published the final volume of Medical essays in 1752, and the first
volume of their Essays and observations, physical and literary was published in
1754. It was followed by two other volumes, one in 1756 and the last one in 1771,
along with a second edition of the two first volumes. The preface to the first volume
briefly summarizes the story of the society, mentioning that it follows the same
goals which other established societies (RSL) have pursued:
The object of this society is the same with that of the other academies, which have
been established in other parts of Europe, the promoting of natural philosophy, and of
literature, by communicating to the public such dissertations as shall be transmitted to
them, either by their own members or by others. ‘Tis allowed, that these two branches
of learning, especially the former, are more promoted by the observation of facts than
by the most ingenious reasonings and disputations (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh
1754, p. v).
It is worth noting that the writers of the preface (Monro and Hume3), tell us that
the method should also be used outside natural philosophy, mentioning literature in
particular. This supports the claim that their society was fully committed to the
experimental method, regardless of the area of inquiry. Their praise for experimen-
tal philosophy is confirmed after the above passage, where there is a reference most
likely to Bacon and Newton and their contribution to natural philosophy:
There arise, from time to time, bold and happy geniuses, who introduce method and
simplicity into particular branches of science; and reducing the scattered experiments to
more general theorems, abridge the science of nature. Hints of this kind, we hope, may be
able to pass thro’ our hands; and at worst, our collections will be a species of magazine, in
which facts and observations, the sole means of true induction, will be deposited for the
purposes of philosophy (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1754, p. vi).
3 Although the authorship of the preface is usually ascribed only to Hume, I am working on a paper
that shows that this is not the case.
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Although these passages show their full commitment to the experimental
method, the society did feel that some topics had to be banned certain from being
discussed at the society:
The sciences of theology, morals, and politics, the society are resolved intirely to exclude
from their plan. However difficult the inferences in these sciences, the facts, on which they
are founded, are extremely obvious; and we could not hope, by our collections, to be, in this
respect, of any service to the public (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1754, p. vii).
Even though they still describe them as ‘sciences’ and founded on facts, they
exclude them because they want to avoid topics that will lead to personal disputes,
and not because they could not be treated like the other sciences. This particular
exclusion is most likely one of the reasons why a number of the members of the
Philosophical Society of Edinburgh decided to establish the Select Society of
Edinburgh, which debated questions in morals, politics, economy, arts and litera-
ture. There is nothing in the rules annexed to the minute book, or any methodologi-
cal statement that can tell us explicitly that they also followed the experimental
method. There is a rule on the topics to be debated that only excludes topics on
“revealed religion, or which may give occasion to vent any Principles of Jacobit-
ism,” presumably for the same reason their parent society excluded political and
religious topics. Roger Emerson mentions in his paper on the society that they
followed what he calls ‘empirical methodological norms,’ praised the work Locke
and Newton, and that experience was their guide in moral science. But there is
nothing in the minute book or question book that points this out. Emerson’s
conjecture is probably based mostly on the character and other works of the famous
members of the society, like David Hume and Adam Smith.
What we can say of the Select Society from the available manuscripts is that they
were fully committed to Lord Bacon’s purpose where the society was supposed to
contribute for the progress of the nation. Besides the minute book, the society kept a
question book which contained the topics proposed by the members to be discussed
at the meetings. Among them we find many that were strictly related with the actual
state of the country and ways to contribute to its progress. Many members of the
society were Edinburgh businessmen involved with trades and manufactures and
were interested in debating questions directly related to the improvement of their
enterprises, and in consequence the economic and industrial progress of Edinburgh.
The question book shows that the members proposed and debated a number of
questions related to trades, taxes and manufactures. The following are just a small
sample of them: “Whether Bounties on the exportation of Corn be advantageous to
Trade and manufactures as well as to agriculture?”, “Whether the Numbers of
Banks now in Scotland be useful to the trade of their Country? And whether paper
Credit be advantageous to a nation?”, “Whether the Bounty should be continued on
the Exportation of low priced linens made in Scotland?”, “Do the Laws in Scotland
relating to Coalers and Salters promote the Interest of this Country?” (Minutes of
the Select Society of Edinburgh, MSS 170).
Besides the vast number of questions recorded that have something to do with
the economic and social progress of Scotland, the society created two off-shoot
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societies specifically designed to promote the progress of Scotland: the Edinburgh
Society for the encouragement of arts, sciences, manufactures and agriculture, and
The Society for promoting the reading and speaking of the English language in
Scotland. The former gave premiums in different categories, with the following
purpose in mind:
To encourage genius, to reward industry, to cultivate the arts of peace, are objects deserving
the attention of public-spirited persons.
That the inhabitants of Scotland may become diligent in labour, and excellent in arts, is
the concern of all who indeed love their country (Edinburgh Society for the Encouragement
of Arts, Sciences, Manufactures and Agriculture, p. 3).
They gave prizes for the best essay in taste, best essay in vegetation, best discovery
in science, best printed book, best printed cotton cloth, best beer, best carpet, best crop
of potatoes, of tulips, and so on (An account of the Edinburgh Select Society 1755,
pp. 126–130). The members of the society believed that this was the encouragement
needed to promote the Scottish industry. But the efforts of the society to contribute to
the progress of Scotland did not stop at the awarding of prizes. There is one situation in
particular that shows the practical outcome of the debates of the society. The society
debated a question regarding the roads of Scotland, as we know from the list of
questions given in the Scots Magazine for March 1757, namely, “What is the best
method of getting public highways made, and repaired: whether by a turn-pike, as in
many places in G. Britain? By county or parish work? By a tax? Or by what other
method?” (Questions treated in the Edinburgh Society 1757, p. 164). The same
periodical published in 1759 part of a document that related the outcome of the debate,
which resulted in a set of proposals and a plan that eventually resulted in the
improvement of the Scottish roads.
The other off-shoot society, for the English language, was created due to the
poor prose of the Scottish university students and the desire of government officials
to be more eloquent. For this purpose the society subsidized a series of lectures on
the English language given by Thomas Sheridan. I quote the Scots Magazine for
1761 to show the success of the lectures:
They were attended by more than 300 gentlemen, the most eminent in this country for their
rank and abilities; who expressed no less satisfaction with the ingenuity and justness of his
[Sheridan’s] sentiments, than with the elegant and interesting manner in which he deliver
them (Lectures on the English tongue by Mr. Sheridan 1761, p. 390).
The rules and prefaces give us a picture of the beliefs of the founders of the societies
regarding the purpose of their institutions and themethod to carry it out. Even though it
is clear that they followed the experimental method, the available discourses and
essays provide even more evidence of the commitment to the experimental method
the members of such societies had adopted. Most of the essays included in the three
collected volumes express in some way the rejection of mere speculation and the
promotion of the experimental method. I will only refer to some of the more explicit
passages that illustrate this.
The first two essays of the first volume are on the laws of motion. The first one is
by Henry Homes, Lord Kames, and the second one by John Stewart as a reply to
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Kames’ essay. Even though they disagreed, we can see that the discussion is always
held within the bounds of experimental philosophy, both of them relying on
experiment and observation for their arguments. Lord Kames’ essay starts with
the following statement where he shows his apathy towards speculative philosophy:
Nothing has more perplexed philosophy, than an unlucky propensity, which makes us grasp
at principles, without due regard to facts and experiments. . .This bent of the mind is
productive of manifold errors. Prepossessed once by a favourite principle, we are no longer
open to conviction. Every phenomenon must be accommodated to that principle, and every
opposite fact, however obstinate, must go for nothing.
Even in Natural Philosophy, theory was introduced before experiment, and every
philosopher urged his own notions, without regard to truth or reality. This produced a
mass of undigested and contradictory theory; which at length could not fail to bring on the
discovery, that the whole was a little better than a fancy and chimera.
But tho’ our only sure guides to truth are fact and experiments, it is however expedient to
keep the end in view. Facts and Experiments are useless lumber, if we are not to reason about
them, nor draw any consequences from them. . .Theory becomes only a source of error, when
we indulge in it too much, or attach ourselves to it beyond what facts and experiments can
justify. In short, theory is vain without experiment, and experiments are best understood by
applying them to theory (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1754, pp. 1–3).
Lord Kames is constantly referring in his essay to facts and observations, and to
the rejection of false hypothesis. He concludes his essay by reminding us that his
comments are based on facts and observation and not mere conjectures:
I shall conclude the essay with the following observation, that the powers I have ascribed to
matter, are in nothing similar to occult qualities. The error of those who dealt in the doctrine
of occult qualities was, in attributing every different effect to some quality or cause confined
to that single effect. . .This was not advancing a single step in knowledge, but amusing one’s
self with words in place of things (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1754, p. 68).
John Stewart’s reply is also written using the rhetoric of the experimental method,
always talking about experiments and observation as the only sources of knowledge,
but there is no explicit methodological statement like the ones found in Kames’ essay.
We do find such statements in an essay by Charles Alston on the sexes of the plants.
His aim is to give an overview of the available theories regarding the sexes of the
plants and reject them for not being based on facts and experiments. After reviewing
most of the argument from different botanists, he even rejects arguments from
analogy in natural philosophy, which he believes are not reliable:
Thus I think I have sufficiently answered all the arguments for the sexes of plants, taken
either from the structure of flowers, or experiments of any consequence that I could meet
with. But since no small stress seems still to be laid on the analogy between plants and
animals, as much favouring this doctrine; I must beg leave a little to consider it also. . . the
method of reasoning by analogy, is but too apt to lead us into mistakes. . .for mere analogy,
based on facts, and extended by conjecture, however plausible, can at most, but furnish
motives for a reasonable doubt, and further inquiry (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh
1754, p. 270).
We can see here that Alston rejects the argument from analogy since all it does is
extend facts by conjectures, showing his full commitment to the experimental
method and rejecting even the more plausible theories regarding the sexes of the
plants. We find similar expression of this commitment in two essays by a fellow
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teacher of Alston at Edinburgh, the chemist Andrew Plummer. His first essay in the
collection relates some observations on chemical solutions. Plummer introduces
the essay by clearly stating his methodology:
I shall lay down these remarks by way of propositions, and, after each, shall mention the
facts or experiments which gave occasion to the remark, or which confirm and illustrate the
proposition (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1754, p. 284).
Similarly, in his second essay Plummer contrasts speculative and experimental
philosophy. The essay is about neutral salts and in it he uses some principles of
motion. He concludes the essay with the following remark:
These principles of motion in matter, are not the vain fictions of men merely speculative in
philosophy, but evidently deduced from observations and experiments on a great variety of
bodies in many different circumstances (Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1754, p. 340).
This is perhaps the most explicit expression of the experimental/speculative
distinction in the collection of essays, although there are many instances where
the praise for the experimental method is present. Thomas Melville reinforces this
sentiment in his essay on light and colors. He contrasts Euler’s theory with
Newton’s, preferring the latter for the method and consistence with experience.
Here is Melville praising Newton:
As it is of great consequence in philosophy, to distinguish between facts and hypotheses,
however plausible; it ought to be observed, that the various refrangibility, reflexibility, and
inflexibility of the several colours, and their alternate dispositions at equal intervals to be
reflected and transmitted, which are the whole ground-work of the Newtonian system, are
to be considered as certain facts deduced form experiment (Philosophical Society of
Edinburgh 1754, p. 50).
Not only does he praise the Newtonian method, but later on when mentioning
Descartes he shows his aversion to speculative philosophy:
From the lazy method of philosophizing in the closet, among books and diagrams, there
never arose, never will arise, any discovery of consequence (Philosophical Society of
Edinburgh 1754, p. 88).
There are plentymore passageswhere the allegiance of the authors can be detected,
either from their rejection of vain speculation or their constant references to facts,
observation, and experiments as the only foundation for their claims. The quotes
provided here illustrate nicely the attitude held by the Society and itsmembers. But the
adoption of the experimental method by them was not just expressing an attitude and
following a methodology. The Scottish societies found great value in the emphasis on
practical outcomes contained within the experimental method.
9.5 The Progress of Scotland
So far we have examined the commitment of the society to the experimental
method, but not much has been mentioned of their impact on society. This is
where Bacon’s Solomon’s college plays an influential role. If we recall Bacon’s
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description, acquiring knowledge through the experimental method was only one
part of the purpose of the college. Knowledge was not enough unless it was used for
the progress of mankind. Nowhere was this attitude as important as it was for the
Edinburgh societies. Their desire and willingness to follow the functions proposed
by Bacon and develop practical uses for their experiments was attempted and
achieved with success in some cases. In what follows I will show some examples
of how some of the undertakings of the society evolved into practical contributions
for the development of Scotland.
One of these undertakings was the proper mapping of the country, specifically
of Orkney, the Shetland Islands, and the northern coasts. The main reason for
carrying out this task was that there was a lack of accurate maps for large areas
of the country, and completing them would benefit trade and commerce by accu-
rately mapping out trade routes.
The society ceased to be active after the death of Colin MacLaurin in 1746, but it
was revived around 1750 and started meeting again. With the revival a change of
vice-presidents was in order, and this shifted the societies focus to a much more
industry-oriented output. Lord Kames and Robert Whytt occupied the positions,
the former being the one that drove the societies experiments and discussions to
have some impact in the public life of Scotland. The Philosophical Society
discussed a number of papers on fisheries, the uses of peat, a proposal for an engine
to raise water from coal or lead mines, as well as all sort of questions on improve-
ments to make mines more efficient.
A letter from Alexander Dick shows this drive to put their experiments into
practical use:
I have been wishing for the Aera to see those collections of facts and circumstances (I have
been making in relation to our entails, our high roads, the employment of the industrious
poor, & the increase of our population, in which my good Lord kames & some others have
given me great assistance) brought into real utility. I have no other ambition for the years I
have to live but to contribute all in my power to improve Medicine. . . (Cited in Emerson
1981, p. 154).
Sir Alexander also carried out, with the help of the chemists of the society, an
alternative to linen rags which supply was decreasing. They engaged in paper-
making from a plant found at the ponds around Edinburgh. This alternative helped
not only stop the decrease, but it actually contributed to arise in linen production, as
Emerson points out (Emerson 1981, p. 163). Description of operations and diseases
helped advancements in medicine, specially the work on fevers by Robert Whytt,
William Cullen, and John Pringle. The Monro’s also read a number of papers on
operations and dissection, which proved to be helpful for the medical students and
increase the reputation of the Edinburgh Medical School.
These are just some examples of the impact the activities of the society had on
Scotland’s public life. They show that the society was concerned with the utility of
their discussions, turning facts and observations into practical uses for the progress
of the country. This practical consideration was attached to the adoption of the
experimental method, and without this methodological commitment the societies
would not have had the impact they had on eighteenth-century Scotland.
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